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A SURVEY OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES 
OF HERBERT HOOVER 
DURING HIS PRESIDENCY 
by 
Adelaide B. Cambridge 
Social Science 486 
Eastern Illinois University 
November 61 1961 
This paper is a survey of the foreign policy of Herbert Hoover 
during his presidency. He is often associated only with domestic issues 
and the Great Depression, and his foreign policies have been somewhat 
unfamiliar. The more reading that was done, the more interesting and 
absorbing became his ideas and attempts to formulate his actions. The 
topic was chosen partially because of an intense interest in American 
history. There has been--and still is--a violently pro-Hoover or anti-
Hoover sentiment and criticism regarding this former president. Another 
reason for this selection is that Mr. Hoover is a contemporary. There 
may be added personal interest because he was born in a little Iowa town 
near my former home. I have attempted to present a survey of the Hoover 
foreign policies as he expressed them and attempted to carry them out. 
There has been considerable amount written by historians and scholars on 
this subject but in the final analysis, it is based primarily on the 
Hoover Memoirs and State Papers which have been extensively used and 
quoted to establish authenticity and to illustrate the particular policy 
under discussion. Insofar as it is possible, each foreign policy will 
be discussed individually and in the order in which it presented itself. 
2 
The nineteen-twenties in America were bewildering and gaudy. It 
was a time of exuberance and optimistic belief that prosperity had come 
to stay. There was violence in the underworld with prohibition and 
gangsterism. There was a so-called 11revolttt of the younger generation 
in that jazz age. Billy Sunday, Babe Ruth, and Charles A. Lindbergh were 
in the headlines. Fortunes were fantastic and illusory. Prosperity was 
zooming and there was a runaway stock market. It was a time of cynicism 
and escape. There were a few prophets of doom but little attention was 
given to the building up of forces for a depression and a holocaust in 
the not too distant future. Imperialism had not ended with the Armistice, 
and power politics were on the rampage in Europe. The world was soon 
to face a great economic crisis and its destructive evils. 
Against this background, on March the 4th, 1929, Herbert Clark 
Hoover became the thirty-first president of the United States after having 
been elected by an overwhelming electoral vote of 444 to 87 for Alfred 
E. Smith.1 The Iowa-born Republican had graduated from Stanford and had 
become a widely acclaimed mining engineer, then an indefatigable director 
9f relief for Belgium, Head of the United States Food Administration, a 
humanitarian in postwar relief work, and a tireless Secretary of Commerce 
since 1921. Never before had this shy man been elected to a public office. 
He was not an efficiency expert in the game of politics as he was in 
engineering. He had no brilliant personality nor flair for the dramatic. 
He didn't smile for the photographer, and irritated some Americans because 
lFoster Rhea Dulles, The United States Since 1865 (Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, l9S9), p. 302. -
J 
of the stiff collars he wore. Yet his tastes were modest and simple, and 
he was a firm believer in hard work. He was both a realist and an ideal-
ist. To some observers he was cold and distant and yet he was reputed 
to be a genial and gracious host, a sensitive man. Fellow associates 
were fervently loyal and had a sincere respect for the quiet Quaker who 
believed in peace, the basic goodness of mankind, and in Americanism. 2 
Through the years his friends have been full of praise and commendation; 
his enemies have dwelled on his failures and ignored any accomplishments. 
On a cold, rainy, March day, the inaugural address of Mr. Hoover 
dealt with American hopes and ideals. His program included a desire to 
advance world peace and international progress. As an engineer he had 
travelled widely throughout the world and was familiar with many coun-
tries. Through his relief work he was acquainted with the human misery 
and devastation of war. He strongly stood for peace but not for pacifism. 
As he stated it in his inaugural address, there could be no doubt that 
he wanted universal peace: 
The United States fully accepts the profound truth that 
our own progress, prosperity and peace are interlocked with 
the progress, prosperity and peace of all humanity. The whole 
world is at peace. The dangers to a continuation of this 
peace today are largely the fear and suspicion which still 
haunt the world. No suspicion or fear can be rightly directed 
toward our country •••• We not only desire peace with the world, 
but to see peace maintained throughout the world. We wish 
to advance the reign of justice and reason toward the extinction 
of force. 
The recent treaty for the renunciation of war as an instru-
ment of national policy sets an advanced standard in our concep-
tion of the relations of nations. Its acceptance should pave 
the way to greater limitation of armament, the offer of which 
we sincerely extend to the world. But its full realization 
also implies a greater and greater perfection in the 
2navid Hinshaw, Herbert Hoover: American Quaker (New York, Farrar, 
Straus, and Company, 1950) , p. 14. 
instrumentalities for pacific settlement of controversies between 
nations. In the creation and use of these instrumentalities 
we should support every sound method of conciliation, arbitration, 
and judicial settlement. American statesmen were among the first 
to propose and they have constantly urged upon the world, the 
establishment of a tribunal for the settlement of controversies 
of a justiciable character. The Permanent Court of International 
Justice in its major purpose is thus peculiarly identified with 
American ideals and with American statesmanship. • • • 
Our people have determined that we should make no political 
engagements such as membership in the League of Nations, which 
may commit us in advance as a nation to become involved in the 
settlements of controversies between other countries •••• 
It is impossible, my countrymen, to speak of peace without 
profound emotion. In thousands of homes in America, in millions 
of homes around the world, there are vacant chairs. It would 
be a shameful confession of our unworthiness if it should develop 
that we have abandoned the hope for which all these men died. 
Surely civilization is old enough, surely mankind is mature 
enough so that we ought in our own lifetime to find a way to 
permanent peace. Abroad, to west and east, are nations whose 
sons mingled their blood with the blood of our sons on the 
battlefields. Most of these nations have contributed to our 
race, to our culture, our knowledge, and our progress. From 
one of them we derive our very language and from many of them 
much of the genius of our institutions. Their desire for peace 
is as deep and sincere as our own.3 
After the election and before his inauguration, Mr. Hoover made his 
4 
first presidential venture in the field of foreign affairs. In the winter 
of 1928-1929, President-elect and Mrs. Hoover took a good-will trip of 
about six weeks to the principal Latin American countries in order that 
he might personally emphasize the American desire for their independence, 
expansion, and increasing prosperity, and to exchange viewpoints with their 
leaders. During his preceding eight years as Secretary of Comrr~rce, Mr. 
Hoover had become increasingly concerned about American policies south of 
the Panama Canal. As president, Mr. Hoover was able to establish the 
principle that American citizens investing their capital in South .America 
3william Starr Myers, ed., The State Papers ~Other Public Writings 
of Herbert Hoover, Vol. 1, (Garden City, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 
1934) pp. 8-10. 
5 
were doing so at their own risk, "and that our interventions on their 
behalf if they were unjustly treated would be purely moral representations. 114 
There had been mili ta.ry interference in Central and South America 
under preceding presidents, and the Monroe Doctrine had come to be inter-
preted as giving the United States the right, through military intervention, 
to maintain order, which hampered any feeling of harmonious relationship 
and good will. There were bitter feelincs against the occupation of Haiti 
and Nicaragua by the United States marines, an evidence of Yankee imperi-
alism. These troops were gradually withdrawn, the last ones early in 
1933.5 Shortly after Mr. Hoover became president, a revised policy of the 
Monroe Doctrine, as drawn up by Under-Secretary J. Reuben Clark, was 
publicized. This policy eliminated the concern 01· the United States with 
internal affairs south of the Panama Cana1. 6 
Fourteen short talks were given during the visit, all of which empha-
sized the ngood neighbor" theme. Typical were Mr. Hoover's words at the 
Custom House of Amapala: 
I come to pay a call of friendship. In a sense I represent 
on this occasion the people of the United States extending a 
friendly greeting to our fellow democracies on the American 
continent. I would wish to symbolize the friendly visit of 
one good neighbor to another. In our daily life, good neighbors 
call upon each other as the evidence of solicitude for the common 
welfare and to learn of the circumstances and point of view 
of each, so that there may come both understanding and respect 
which are the cementing forces of' all enduring society. This 
4Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Vol. 2 (New York, 
The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 334. 
>Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 58. 
6samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States 
(New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19S3), p. 222." -
should be equally true amongst nations. INe have a desire to 
maintain not only the cordial relations of7governments with each 
other but the relations of good neighbors. 
Another result of the journey to South America was the ending of a 
disagreement among Peru, Chile, and Bolivia that had lasted for years. 
Officials from these countries were persuaded to list concessions that 
could be made and Mr. Hoover was eventually able to suggest a compromise 
that settled the issue.a 
Yet another tangible development of this trip to La.tin America was 
6 
an improvement and reorganization of the diplomatic service to our southern 
neighbors. Mr. Hoover had a first-hand opportunity to witness both career 
diplomats and political appointees and saw fit to remove the latter as 
rapidly as possible. This naturally resulted in a smoother and more 
effective relationship.9 
As an additional means of better corrununication and international good-
will, Mr. Hoover talked with officials and leaders as to the establishment 
of a regular air service. On March 15, 1930, the new service of airmail 
to Central and South America was started, a direct result of the visit 
south of the Panama Cana1.10 
Through exchange visits of students and teachers, Mr. Hoover felt that 
both La.tin America and the United States would learn more of history, 
7Herbert Hoover, Addresses Delivered During the Visit of Herbert 
Hoover to Central and South America (Washington, ~C., Pan""Ainerican Union, 
1929), p. 3. 
8Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Vol. 2 (New York, 
The Macmillan Company, 19.52), pp. 214-215. 
9aay Lyman Wilbur and Arthur Mastick Hyde, The Hoover Policies 
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p • .58~ 
lOwilliam Starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration 
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 42;:-
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customs, culture, and the aspirations of each country. However, because 
of the depression and economic unrest, nothing definite was done along 
those Jines. Throughout his administration, President Hoover continu-
ously emphasized the similarity of purpose and ideals in the Latin 
American countries with those of the United States. The fact that he 
undertook a change in our relationship was due in considerable measure to 
the 1913-1929 policy of intervention.11 
A less tangible accomplishment of the trip was the attention and 
publicity that was drawn to South America. Newspapers, magazines, and friendly 
conversations were focused on a part of the world that hadn't had such 
importance given it. Europe had been the center of attraction, but now 
Americans began to realize the importance of another section of the western 
hemisphere. 12 
President Hoover reiterated his Latin American policy in an address 
on April 13, 1929, before the Gridiron Club in Washington, D. c. 
I mention one sinister notion as to policies of the 
United States upon our relationships with our Latin American 
neighbors. That is, fear of an era of the mistakenly called 
dollar diplomacy. The implications that have been colored 
by that expression are not a part of my conception of inter-
national relations. I can say at once that it never has been 
and ought not to be the policy of the United States to inter-
vene by force to secure or maintain contracts between our 
citizens and foreign States or their citi~ens. Confidence 
in that attitude is the only basis upon which the economic 
cooperation of our citizens can be welcomed abroad. It is 
the only basis that prevents cupidity encroaching upon the 
weakness of nations--but, far more than this, it is the true 
expression of the moral rectitude of the United States.13 
llMyers, Vol. 1, 2£• cit., pp. 543-545. 
12Frank H. Simonds, Hoover, South Americanus from the Review 
of Reviews, Vol. LXXIX no. 2, Feb., 1929, pp. 67-70. 
13Myers, Vol. 1, ~· cit., pp. 29-30. 
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Because of the depression, the flotation of foreign loans by American 
banks was not of great importance under President Hoover. One of' the 
occasions when he stated his demands for certain standards and investi-
gations of foreign loans was in a message to the Pan American Cormnercial 
Conference on October 8, 1931 • 
• • • such loans ••• are helpful in world development 
provided always one essential principle dominated the character 
of these transactions. That is, that no nation as a government 
should borrow or no government lend and nations should discouraGe 
their citizens from borrowing or lending unless this money is 
to be devoted to productive enterprise. 
Out of the wealth and the higher standards of living created 
from enterprise itself must come to the borrowing country the 
ability to repay the capital. Any other course of action creates 
obligations impossible of repayment except by a direct sub-
traction from the standards of living of the borrowing country 
and the impoverishment of its people. 
In fact, if this principle could be adopted between the 
nations of the world--that is, if nations would do away with 
the lending of money for the balancing of budgets for purposes 
of 111ilitary equipment or war purposes, or even that type of 
public works which does not bring some direct or indirect pro-
ductive return--a.great number of blessings wou.ld follow to 
the entire wcrld.1.4 
As was already mentioned in referring to President Hoover's inaugural 
address, his hope was for the United States to cooperate with the rest of 
the world in preserving peace. Internationalists hoped for United States 
participation in the World Court but there was still reaction from the 
World War and the voice of isolationism was loud and strong. Mr. Hoover 
abhorred war and gave strong support to solving disputes between nations 
by a court based on the administration of justice. In his Armistice Day 
address of November 11, 1929, President Hoover augmented his stand on 
peace. 
14Myers, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. ?. 
• • • peace is not a static thing. To maintain peace is 
as dynamic in its requirements as is the conduct of war. We 
cannot say "let there be peace" and go about other business. 
Nor are the methods by which peace is to be maintained and war 
prevented to be established by slogans or by abstract phrases 
or by academic theory. Progress toward peace can be attained 
only as a result of realistic practical daily conduct amongst 
nations. It can be the result only of a fra..~k recognition of 
forces which may disturb peace ••• we have convenanted with 
other civilized nations not only to renounce war as an instrument 
of national policy but also we have agreed that we shall settle 
all controversies by pacific means • • • • Our State Department 
is the first of these means. It must be strengthened and supported 
as the great arm of our government, dedicated to the organization 
of peace • • • • We need further to extend our treaties with 
other countries providing methods for reference of controversies 
to conferences, to inquiry as to fact, or to arbitration, or to 
judicial determination. • • • We have need to define the rules 
of conduct of nations and to formulate an authoritative system 
of international law. We have need under proper reservations 
to support the World Court in order that we may secure judicial 
determination of certain types of controversies and build up 
precedents which add to the body of international law. By these 
agencies we relegate a thousand frictions to orderly processes 
of settlement and by deliberation in action we prevent their 
development into national inflammation • • • • Men of good will 
throughout the world are working earnestly and honestly to 
perfect the equipment and preparedness for peace. But there 
is something high above and infinitely more powerful than the 
work of all ambassadors and ministers, something far more power-
ful than treaties and the machinery of arbitration and concilia-
tion and judicial decision, something more vital than even our 
covenants to abolish war, something more mighty than armies and 
navies in defense. 
That is to build the spirit of good will and friendliness, 
to create respect and confidence, to stimulate esteem between 
peoples--this is the far greatest guaranty of peace. In that 
atmosphere, all controversies become but passing incidents of 
the day. Nor does this friendliness, respect, and esteem come 
to nations who behave weakly or supinely. It comes to those 
who are strong but who use their strength not in arrogance 
or injustice. It is through these means that we establish the 
sincerity, the justice, and the dignity of a great people. 
Th'3t is a new vision of diplomacy that is dawnine; in the world.1.5 
The previous administration had not been successful in obtaining 
ratification of United States participation in the World Court, a plan 
9 
worked out primarily by Elihu Root. Before March 4, 1929, enough members 
1~yers, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 126-131. 
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of the Senate agreed to support membership in the World Court if certain 
revisions could be made. Elihu Root, in spite of advanced age and poor 
health, went to Europe to try to get the constitution of the world Court 
changed so as to satisfy the dissenters in the Senate. He was successful 
and on December 10, 1930, President Hoover, feeling that public opinion 
was in favor of the World Court, offered the amended protocol to the Senate. 
The provisions of the protocols free us from any entangle-
ment in the diplomacy of other nations. We cannot be summoned 
before this Court, we can from time to time seek its services 
by agreement with other nations. These protocols permit our 
withdrawal from the Court at any time without reproach or ill-will. 
The movement for the establishment of such a court origi-
nated with our country. It has been supported by Presidents 
Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge; by Secretaries of State Hughes, 
Kellogg, and Stimson; it springs from the earnest seeking of 
our people for justice in international relations and to streng-
then the foundations of peace. 
Through the Kellogg-Briand Pact we have pledged ourselves 
to the use of pacific means in settlement of all controversies. 
Our great nation, so devoted to peace and justice, should lend 
its cooperation in this effort of the nations to establish a 
great agency for such pacific settlements.16 
Opposition was so strong that a vote was not taken. A year later, 
President Hoover again presented the amended protocol. 
In the past session of the Congress I transmitted to the 
Senate protocols providing for adherence by the United States 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Upon that 
occasion I expressed my views fully not only of the wisdom of 
such action, but that the safeguards against European entangle-
ments stipulated for by the Senate had been in effect secured 
and the interest of the United States protected. I need not 
repeat that for over twelve years every President and every 
Secretary of State has urged this action as a material contri-
bution to the pacific settlement of controversies among nations 
and a further assurance against war.17 
The strength of isolationism was too strong for the matter to be 
16Ibid., pp. 460-461. 
17Myers, Vol. 2, ~· cit., pp. 80-81. 
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successfully brought to a vote during the Hoover administration. However, 
during his years as Secretary of State from 1929-1933, Mr. Stimson was 
able to sign treaties of arbitration with twenty-five countries, and treaties 
of conciliation with seventeen. Thus the United States was obligated with 
nearly every country on the globe in the event that difficulties couldn't 
be solved by negotiation, to refer to these processes. 
On May 15, 1929, President Hoover announced his refusal to approve 
the United States joining in the World Bank, or the Bank for International 
Settlements as it was also called, which was created in Europe by leading 
banks in twenty-six countries for the purpose of revising reparations. 
The President reasoned that it might be used either to inflate or to deflate 
credit. A month later he was again urged to back a proposal for the 
United States directly or indirectly joining in the formation of the World 
Bank. Again, his judgment was that .American finance might be influenced 
by European actions, and he refused such support. 18 
Beginning with his inaugural address, President Hoover's speeches 
clearly show that his aspiration and hope in foreign affairs was focused 
on peace, and he felt that the United States should take more responsibility 
in world affairs. On that rainy, windy March 4th of 1929, the world was 
at peace but the old resentments and fears were still in evidence. Mr. 
Hoover strongly felt that a real contribution in the establishment of 
peace was the Kellogg-Briand Pact, even though there were no provisions 
in it for enforcement. This general treaty for renouncing war as an instru-
ment of national policy had been formulated during the administration of 
Calvin Coolidge by the United States Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, 
and Aristide Briand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Over sixty 
1~rs and Newton, ~· £!!., pp. 15-16; 73; 395. 
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nations signed the pact, each promising to use peaceful means in settling 
controversies. The Kellogg Pact had been ratified by the Senate in January, 
1929. The Pact of Peace had two parts which provided: 
Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare 
• • • they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of nationa~ 
policy in their relations with one another. 
Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the 
settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever 
nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among 
them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.19 
Mr. Hoover had favored an additional section that wou~d make the Pact 
stronger by including: 
(a;) ••• in case of violation of the Pact, the other powers 
should have a right to intervene by setting up an impartial 
commission to investigate, conciliate, propose a settlement, 
publish the facts, and withdraw diplomatic recognition from 
the recalcitrant party. 
(b) A declaration by the nations that they would not 
recognize any territorial or other gains of any nation from 
aggression and the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition in such 
cases.2D 
However, Secretary Kellogg had objected on the grounds that it would 
be too much like action the league might undertake and that some of the 
League members would be offendect. 21 
How ironic that only the day before the Proclamation was to be read, 
there were ominous rumblings between Russia and China. Secretary of 
State Stimson was quite upset and urged the two countries to settle their 
difficulty without resorting to war. The Japanese then stepped into the 
dispute with feelings hurt that they weren't consulted. The issue was 
hurriedly settled and the Pact was read with the world apparently still 
19Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1952), p. 268. 
20Hoover, Vol. 2, .££• cit., p. 336. 
211oc. cit. 
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at peace. That President Hoover was in whole-hearted support was evidence 
on July 24, 1929, when he declared the Pact in effect: 
That was a proposal to the conscience and idealism of 
civilized nations. It suggested a new step in international 
law, rich with meaning, pregnant with new ideas in the conduct 
of world relations. It represented a platform from which there 
is instant appeal to the public opinion of the world as to 
specific acts and deeds •••• I congratulate this assembly, 
the states it represents, and indeed, the entire world upon the 
coming into force of this additional instrument of humane endeavor 
to do away with war as an instrument of national policy and 
to obtain ~y pacific means alone the settlement of international 
disputes. 2 
President Hoover made no attempt to encourage the United States in 
joining the I.Bague of Nations, but he did endorse active cooperation with 
I.Bague activities of international scope, such as trade in narcotics, 
expansion of marine law, and radio regulation. The United States was 
also involved in treaties that included commerce, aviation, merchant 
marine, protection of intellectual property, slavery and disease. These 
treaties would help to have a more civilized world, and also brought the 
realization of world responsibility to Americans. 24 
Although a tariff issue is not principally in the realm of foreign 
affairs but is primarily of domestic concern, yet it cannot be ignored 
in surveying the issues of the world that faced Mr. Hoover shortly after 
he assumed the presidency. One of the campaign platforms of the Republican 
party in 1928 was concerned with increasing agricultural tariffs and adjust-
ing industrial tariffs. In summation, President Hoover's policies on the 
tariff fall into two ideas. First of all, he strongly believed a tariff 
should serve to protect American laborers and farmers from competition 
22Loc. Cit. 
23Myers, Vol. 1, ££• cit., pp. 78-79. 
24Hoover, Vol. 2, ££• cit., p. 337. 
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from foreigners that had lower standards of living. Second.J.y, he advocated 
a non-partisan Tariff Connnission to decide on rates which would be levied 
according to the difference in costs of production in America and in a 
foreign country. He felt that the tariff should not be rigid and inflex-
ible but should adjust to changing conditions. Above all, he maintained 
that politics and the tariff should be separate.25 
President Hoover endorsed the idea that there should be a balanced 
economy in the United States and the way to obtain it would be by exporting 
materia.ls and goods particularly suited to production at home and exchanging 
them for articles accordingly suited to the economy and resources abroad. 
The result would be that tariffs would offer protection primarily to the 
entire economic program of the nation and secondari.ly to protecting certain 
interests. The situation was of such a serious nature that with the urging 
of Senator William E. Borah, President Hoover called a special session 
of Congress little more than a month after taking office. He said: 
I have ca.lled this speciai session of Congress to redeem 
two pledges given in the last election--farm relief and limited 
changes in the tariff • • • • 
An effective tariff upon agricultural products, that will 
compensate the farmer's higher costs and higher standards of living 
has a dual purpose. Such a tariff not only protects the farmer 
in our domestic market but it also stimulates him to diversify 
his crops and to grow products that he could not otherwise produce, 
and thus lessens his dependence upon exports to foreign markets. 
The great expansion of production abroad under the conditions 
I have mentioned renders foreign competition in our export markets 
increasingly serious. It seems but natural, therefore, that 
the American farmer, having been greatly handicapped in his 
foreign market by such competition from the younger expanding 
countries, should ask that foreign access to our domestic market 
should be regulated by taking into account the differences in 
our costs of production • • • • 
25wilbur and Hyde, ~· ~., p. 181. 
In considering the tariff for other industries than 
agriculture, we find that there have been economic shifts 
necessitating a readjustment of some of the tariff schedules 
15 
• • • • What we need to remedy now is whatever substantial loss 
of employment may have resulted from shifts since that time • • • • 
No discrimination against any foreign industry is involved 
in equalizing the difference in costs of production at home 
and abroad and thus taking from foreign producers the advantages 
they derive from paying lower wages to labor. Indeed, such 
equalization is not only a measure of social justice at home, 
but by the lift it gives to our standards of living we increase 
the demand for those goods from abroad that we do not ourselves 
produce. In a large sense we have learned that the cheapening 
or the toiler decreases rather than promotes permanent prosperity 
because it reduces the consuming power of the people •••• 
We also need important revision in some of the administrative 
phases of the tariff. The Tarirf Commission should be reorgan-
ized • • • administrative changes in the rates of duty should 
be made more automatic • • • • I believe a formula can be found 
that will insure 2gpid and accurate determination 01· needed 
changes in rates. 
Experts in the field of economics urged Mr. Hoover not to endorse 
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, as it was called, because it would seriously 
reduce a market for European exports and it would eliminate the ability 
of countries abroad in purchasing United State~ exports. Advice was 
also given that it would encourage more trade barriers throughout the 
27 
world which in turn would increase the load on the American economy. 
An opposition force arose consisting of Republican Old Guards, 
Progressives, and Democrats which started a tariff revision, completely 
ignoring the President's desires and listing about 21,000 different 
items. The House of Representatives passed the Smoot-Hawley bill the 
foll.owing month but the Senate o.ebated over the bill for more than a 
year, with the resu.Lt that it wa~ June 16, 1930, berore both Houses 
pas~ed on it. On.i.y a few days before President Hoover signed the 
2~yers, Vol. 1, ~· cit., pp. 31-36. 
27Dulles, ~· cit., p. 284. 
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tariff bill, he described it as "vicious, extortionate and obnoxious. 1128 
President Hoover stood firm in insisting that the tariff bill include 
flexible provisions and a bi-partisan Tariff Commission, and signed the 
bill when these changes were made.29 
An unfortunate result of this legislation was that it required so 
much ot the President•s time and attention that he couldn 1t devote more 
of his energy to the stress and strain of economic conditions at home. 
He had not lacked for advice from all sections of the country, and there 
was a tremendous amount of criticism directed at the President as a result 
of his stand on the tariff question. 
During the rest of President Hoover's administration, 250 industrial 
items were reviewed by the Tariff Commission and the rates increased in 
about 75 of them.30 
S0111e critics have taken the position that the internal depression 
plus the high tariffs resulted in great econ0111ic distress in foreign 
countries. Economists also pointed out that countries abroad weren't 
able to purchase as many American exports because of an increase in 
duties. Economics throughout the entire world were becoming more inter-
related so that action taken in one country effected another. Europe 
was already in a depression and was not moving in the direction of 
L/ internation peace and cooperation. 
Retaliation as a result of the new tariff was not long in coming. 
There was discrimination against American exports and the United States 
2~axine Block, ed., Current Biog.rap!ly (New York, H. w. Wilson 
Company, 1943), P• .309. 
29william Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 
1929-~ (New York, CharlesScrtbner•s Sons, 1940), PP• 126-127. 
30w'ilbur and Hyde, .22• .£!!•• p. 186. 
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was accused of an economic war. In decreasing imports, foreign countries 
found it harder to make war payments to the United States, and critics 
of the Hawley-Smoot bill maintained the depression abroad was made worse. 
It should be remembered that even before this tariff legislation was put 
into effect, imports from America had already decreased overseas because 
of higher tariffs and trade barriers. In fact, a Customs Truce Conference 
had been held at Geneva in the spring of 1930 to alleviate the tariff 
situation in Europe, but it was not a success. Supporters of the Hawley-
Smoot tariff maintained that the Act had nothing to do with the payment 
of war debts nor could the decline in trade be blamed on to the tariff. 
After the Austrian and German banking crash in June, 1931 and the British 
financial crisis of September, 1931, trade restrictions increased tremen-
dously and the world trade picture looked darker than ever. 
The tariff issue was a complicated one and played a large part in 
the campaign issues of the next presidential election. On the grassroots 
level, voters formed their opinions or the tariff and its implications accord-
ing to their means of livelihood and their expenditures. The depression and 
its repercussions were still being acutely felt and as such were vital factors 
in all economic levels. Feelings and aspirations are reflected in voting, 
which may be a weakness of a democracy: people too of ten tend to weigh 
advantages to themselves individually with too little regard for the nation 
as a whole. However, it would be disastrous to consider only national aspira-
tions with total disregard for such effects on a world-wide basis. Surely 
President Hoover's contact with the people in the campaign was partially 
responsible !or his failure on the tariff issue. By contrast with Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, he was cold, distant, scholarly, and lacked personal communi-
cation. 
In regard to national defense and world disarmament, President 
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Hoover's policy was simple and clear-cut but ini'initely complex to carry 
out: he wanted peace--and not war--for the American people, and tried 
to promote disarmament in an attempt to prevent another war. Under the 
Harding administration in 19211 a beginning had been made toward limiting 
naval armaments, but matters between Great Britain and the United States 
had caused the two countries to drift apart since then instead of there 
being a workable agreement between the two countries. In a Memorial 
Day address in 1929 at Arlington National Cemetery, President Hoover 
asserted that the Kellogg Pact should be upheld with a limitation of 
Armaments, and submitted a plan for negotiation with other powers • 
• • • to arrive at any agreement through which we can, 
marching in company with our brother nations, secure reduction 
of armament, we must find a rational yardstick with which to 
make reasonable comparisons of their naval units with ours and 
thus maintain an agreed relativity. So far the world has failed 
to find such a yardstick. To say that such a measure cannot 
be found is the counsel of despair, it is a challenge to the 
naval authorities of the world, it is the condemnation of the 
world to the Sisyphean toil of competitive armaments. 
The present Administration of the United States has under-
taken to approach this vital problem with a new program. We 
feel that it is useless for us to talk of the limitation of 
arms if such limitations are to be set so high as virtually to 
be an incitement to increase armament. The idea of limitation 
of arms has served a useful purpose. It made possible confer-
ences in which the facts about national aspirations could be 
discussed frankly in an atmosphere of friendliness and concili-
ation. Likewise the facts of the technical problems involved, 
and the relative values of varying national needs, have been 
clarified by patient comparison of expert opinions. 
But still the net result has been the building of more 
fighting ships. Therefore we believe the time has come when 
we must know whether the pact we have signed is real, whether 
we are condemned to further and more extensive programs of naval 
construction. Limitation upward is not now our goal, but actual 
reduction of existing commitments to lowered levels. 
Such a program, if it be achieved, is fraught with endless 
blessings. The smaller the armed force of the world, the less 
will armed force be left in the minds of men as an instrument 
of national policy. The smaller the armed force of the world, 
the less will be the number of men withdrawn from the creative 
and productive labors. Thus we shall relieve the toilers of 
the nations of the deadening burden of unproductive expenditures, 
and above all, we shall deliver them from the greatest of human 
calamities--!ear. We shall breathe an air cl~!red o! poison, 
of destructive thought, and of potential war. 
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The A:rtJry had assured President Hoover that it was strong enough to 
repel foreign invasion, and the Air Force was enlarged to about 21800 
planes, which was an increase of forty percent. 32 So it was to the problem 
of naval limitation that President Hoover turned his attention since Great 
Britain and Japan were seemingly engaged in naval rivalry. He wanted a 
Naval Conference held which would attempt to limit all warships, but before 
the Conference could actual]Jr start, agreement needed to be made by the 
leading powers on certain important problems. With the President•s super-
vision, Secretary of State Stimson and Ambassador Charles G. Dawes person-
al]Jr negotiated with the Prime Minister of England, J. Ramsey MacDonald, 
regarding the relative cruiser strength of the two countries. An agreement 
was reached as to the equality in the fighting strength of the two navies 
and there seemed to be a likelihood of also reducing naval strength. A tempo-
rary agreement was sent to Japan, France, and Ita:cy-, with rejection by the 
latter two. President Hoover invited Premier MacDonald to visit this country 
in October, 1929, in order that naval reduction agreements could better be 
reached, as well as promoting amiable relationships. During a cordial and 
friend]Jr visit in Washington and the President's camp at Rapidan, Virginia, 
agreement on the major questions under consideration was made, with approval 
by Japan pending. It is of interest that this was the first visit of a prime 
31.william Starr Myers, ed. 1 The State Pa;ars and Other Public Writings 
or Herbert Hoover, Vol. l (Garden~tY, Doub! ay Doran and Company, 1934) 
PP• 66=67. 
32Hoover, Vol. 2, op. ~., P• 339. 
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minister of England to the United States. Mr. MacDonald was a success with 
his friendliness and personal charm.33 
A joint statement was made on good-will between Britain and the United 
States, a part of which is especially significant. 
The part of each of our governments in the promotion of 
world peace will be different, as one will never consent to 
become entangled in European diplomacy and the other is resolved 
to pursue a policy of active cooperation with its European 
neighbours; but each of our governments will direct its thoughts 
and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the 
world. 
Our conversations have been largely confined to the mutual 
relations of the two countries in the light of the situation 
created by the signing of the Peace Pact. Therefore, in a new 
and reintorced sense the two governments not only declare that 
war between them is unthinkable, but that distrusts and suspi-
cions · arising from doubts and fears which may have been justi-
fied before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence national 
policy. We approach old historical problems from a new angle 
and in a new atmosphere. On the assumption that war between 
us is banished, and that conflicts between our military or naval 
forces cannot take place, these problems have changed their 
meaning and character; and their soluti~ in ways satisfactory 
to both countries, has become possible. 
Plans were made for the Naval Conference of the five great naval 
powers, United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, to meet in 
London in January, 1930. Secretary of State Stimson was head of the 
American delegation, which consisted of Secretary or the Navy Adams, 
Ambassadors Dawes and Gibson, Senators David Reed and Joseph Robinson, 
and Dwight Morrow. The Chief Naval Advisor was Admiral William v. Pratt. 
This was certainly a strong delegation.35 
Early in the Conference it was evident that technical discussions 
33iJenry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace 
~ !!!! (New York, Harper and Brothers, l947J; p. 166. -
~ers, Vol. l, .£f• ~., p. 108. 
3Sstimson and McBundy, .£f• cit., p. 166. 
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would hopelessly involve everyone. There seemed to be no difficulty in 
arrangements with Britain and Japan; however, France was not agreeable 
to reduce its small navy unless some kind of guarantee for her future 
security would be given by the United States and Britain. When this wasn•t 
forthcoming, France wanted a consultative pact in the event of a possible 
attack. Secretary Stimson was willing to accept, but the President disa-
greed because the United States would be morally obligated to give military 
help to France in the event of war. Reports from Europe and more inter-
nationally minded Americans insisted that the United States was destroying 
the Conference, which highly irritated the President who was normally 
calm and conservative. He informed the American delegation that he really 
wasn't concerned whether or not France restricted her navyJ his main 
interest was that Britain agree to an equality with the American navy 
and to extending the 5:5:3 ratio to Britain, Japan, and American navy 
vessels. It France and Italy didn't want to participate in the general 
agreement, it would not be significant. By April 22, 1930, the treaty 
was finished and signed by representatives from the five attending nations, 
although France and Italy signed only acceptance of the minor clauses. 
According to the treaty, the United States and Britain would have parity 
in naval strength. The Japanese would have equality in submarines but they 
agreed to a 5:5:3 ratio tor cruisers, major ships, and auxiliary ships. 
Included was a clause providing that in the event a non-signatory power 
threatened any or the signers in naval construction, restrictive obligations 
were no longer binding. J6 FrOlll Secretary or State Stimson's viewpoint, the 
most important aspect of the treaty was the prohibition or unrestricted 
~arold Wolf'e, Herbert Hoover (New York, Exposition Press, 1956), 
PP• 175-177. 
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submarine warf are.37 
Although there was something achieved toward disarmament, results 
of the Conference were disappointing. Naval rivalry among the big powers 
was temporarily curbed but .American reaction was far from whole hearted 
in its support. In the first place, there was almost a billion dollars 
difference between the American and British navy, and to bring the former 
in line with the latter would not mean a decrease in taxation. Then there 
was opposition by some who felt the naval strength of America had been 
limited too much.38 
The Naval Limitation Treaty was presented to the Senate by the 
President on May 1, 1930, but there was such strong feeling against 
ratification that it adjourned without any action. A special session 
was called on July 7 to discuss the treaty and present reasons for 
ratification. Presid.ent Hoover stated: 
Our people believe that military strength should be held 
in conformity with the sole purpose of national defense; they 
earnestly desire real progress in limitation and reduction of 
naval arms of the world, and their aspiration is for abolition 
of competition in the building of arms as a step toward world 
peace. Such a result can be obtained in no other way than by 
international agreement. 
The present treaty is one which holds these safeguards and 
advances these ideals. Its ratification is in the interest 
of the United States. It is fair to the other participating 
nations. It promotes the cause of good relations. 
• • • • History supports those who hold to agreement as 
the path to peace. 
• • • • We have only to look at the state ot Europe in 
1914 to find ample evidence of the futility and danger of 
competition in arms • • •• 
37stimson and McBundy, .2E• cit., p. 172. 
38wolfe, .2E• cit., P• 177. 
Defense is the primar,y tunction ot government, and there-
fore our first concern in examination of any act of this character 
is the test ot its adequacy in defense. No critic has yet 
asserted that with the naviea provided in this agreement, 
together with our army, our aerial defense, and our national 
resources, we cannot defend ourselves, and certainly we want no 
militar,y establishJl'lent for the purpose ot domination of other 
nations • • • • 
This treaty does mark an important step in disarmament 
and in world peace. It is important for many reasons that it 
should be dealt with at once. The subject has been under dis-
cussion since the Geneva Conference three years ago. The lines 
of this treaty have been known and under discussion since last 
summer. The actual document has been before the American people 
and before the Senate for nearly three months. It has been 
favorably reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Every solitary tact which affects judgment upon the treaty is 
known, and the document itself comprises the sole obligation 
of the United States. If we fail now the world ~11 be again 
plunged backward from its progress toward peace.3 
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There was bitter debate in the Senate. Some feared secret dealings 
had been made. Embittered isolationists were acrimonious. Advocates of 
a big navy and those connected with powerful shipping interests were 
forced to realize that there was plenty of room for expansion under the 
Treaty. On July 211 19301 the London Naval Treaty was ratified, but a 
resolution was also passed exonerating the United States from any secret 
agreements that might have been made. President Hoover signed the treaty 
the following day and released the statement: 
With the ratification by the other governments the Treaty 
will translate an emotion deep in the hearts of millions of 
men and women into a practical fact of government and inter-
national relations. It will renew again the faith of the world 
in the moral forces of good will and patient negotiations as 
against the blind forces of suspicion and competitive armament. 
It will secure the full defense of the United States. It will 
mark a further long step toward lifting the burden of militarism 
from the backs of mankind and to speed the march forward of 
world peace. It will lay the foundations upon which further 
constructive reduction in world arms may be accomplished in 
the future. We should by this act of willingness to join with 
39 6 Myers, Vol. 1, ~· ~·• PP• 351-35 • 
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others in limiting armament, have dismissed from the mind of 
the world any notion that the United States entertains ideas 
or aggression, imperial power or exploitation or foreign nationa.40 
There surely can be no argument that President Hoover wanted to 
further better relations with other countries. His intense desire for 
peace was so great and he believed that naval disarmament would be a 
move in that direction. The relationship with France and Italy were some-
what strained as a result. However the treaty was a move in the direction 
of disarmament and peace. Secretary Stimson considered it even more impor-
tant that it also improved relations with Great Britain and Japan.41 
During President Hoover's administration, new war vessels weighing 
80,000 tons were completed and work on 1001 000 more tons was nearly 
completed. Four battleships were modernized and three more were nearing 
completion.42 
As far as reduction or land armies was concerned in the desire for 
peace, the American army was already so small that it had no bargaining 
power. The Treaty or Versailles called for reduction of armies and the 
League of Nations was supposed to accomplish this. Nothing had been done 
in this direction but the President's viewpoint was that peace was threatened 
as armies grew. On May 4, 1931, at an address before the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Washington, President Hoover emphasized again the 
need for disarmament. 
I wish to give emphasis to ••• the limitation and reduction 
of armament. The world expenditure on all arms is now nearly 
five billions or dollars yearly, an increase or about 70 per 
cent over that previous to the Great War. We stand today with 
40r.zy-ers, Vol. 11 op. cit., PP• 359-360. 
4lstimson and McBundy, op. cit., p. 174. 
42Hoover, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 339. 
nearly 5,500,000 men actively under arms and 20,000,000 more 
in reserves. These vast forces greatly exceed those of the 
pre-war period. They still are not demobilized, even though 
twelve years have passed since the Armistice, because of fear 
and of inability of nations to cooperate in mutual reductions. 
Yet we are all signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, by which 
we have renounced war as an instrument of national policy and 
agreed to settle all controversies by pacific means. Surely, 
with this understanding, the self-defense of nations could be 
assured with proportionately far less military forces than these. 
This vast armament continues not only a burden upon the economic 
recuperation of the world but, of even more consequence, the 
constant threats and fears which arise from it are a serious 
contribution to all forms of instability, whether social, 
political, or economic • • • • 
We have made considerable progress in the limitation and 
reduction of naval arms. We have laid the foundations for still 
further progress in the future. These agreements have contri-
buted greatly to reduce the burden of taxes and to establish 
confidence ang3good. will among the nations who have been signa-
tory to them. 
The United States was assuming a broader role in international affairs 
in spite of nonmembership in the League. Much to the distress and alarm 
of isolationists, the President was determined that the United States should 
be a participant in discussing the reduction of armies in a conference 
ot the League of Nations in Geneva on February 2, 1932. .Ambassador to 
Belgium, Hugh Gibson, was in charge of the American delegation. Arter 
several months with nothing accomplished, Mr. Gibson was advised by the 
President to make a simple and direct proposal abolishing aggressive 
weapons and offering a systematic order for reduction of land armament. 
He advocated abolishing bombing planes, tanks, mobile guns, poison gas, 
and submarines; a reduction in battleships, and a reduction in armies 
by a third above essential police force.44 
43ivers, Vol. 1, ~· !!!•i PP• .559-560. 
44Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, The Problems of Lasting Peace (Garden 
City, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1942), P• 2~. 
part: 
This important document in the endeavor ror disarmament reads in 
The time has come when we should cut through the brush 
and adopt some broad and definite method or reducing the over-
whelming burden ot armament which now lies upon the toilers of 
the world. This would be the most important world step that 
could be taken to expedite economic recovery • • • • We can 
still remain practical in maintaining an adequate self'-defense 
among all nations, we can add to the assurance of peace and 
yet save the people of the world from ten to fifteen billions 
of wasted dollars during the next ten years • • • • The Kellogg-
Briand Pact, to which we are all signatories, can only mean that 
the nations of the world have agreed that they will use their 
arms solely for defense. This reduction should be carried out 
not only by broad general cuts in armaments but by increasing 
the comparative power or defense through decrease in the power 
of attack •••• The reductions must be real and positive. 
They must effect economic relief • • • • I propose that the 
arms of the world should be reduced by nearly one-third • • • • 
In order to reduce the offensive character of all land forces 
as distingi~ished from their defensive character, I propose the 
adoption of ~the presentation already made at the Geneva Conference 
for the abolition of all tanks, all chemical warfare and all 
large mobile guns • • • • I propose • • • there should be a 
reduction of one-third in strength of all land armies over and 
above the so-called police component • • • • All bombing planes 
to be abolished • • • the treaty number and tonnage of battle-
ships shall be reduced one-thirdJ that the treaty tonnage of 
aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers shall be reduced 
by one-third, and that no nation shall retain a submarine ton-
nage greater than 35,000 •••• The effect of this plan would 
be to effect an enormous saving in cost of new construction 
and replacements of naval vessels. It would also save large 
amounts in the operating expenses in all nations of land, sea, 
and air forces • • • • I know of nothing that would give more 
hope for humanity today than the acceptance or4guch a program 
with such minor changes as might be necessary. 
The proposals were enthusiastically received by most of the dele-
gates, and even the Army Technical Committee of the Conference felt it 
was the most constructive suggestion that had been made and voted for 
its adoption. Great Britain and France were in strong opposition, and 
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even though the proposals had the approval of thirty-eight nations, nothing 
other than discussion was done and the meeting adjourned. Political in-
4~ers, Vol. 2, ~· ~., PP• 211-213. 
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security made any decisive action impossible. By the time the Geneva 
Conference should meet again, President Hoover had been defeated for re-
election. 46 
On the same day that President Hoover notified Congress of his in-
tent to send delegates to the Geneva Conference, he urged Senate rati-
fication of a treaty controlling trade in arms and ammunition, signed 
by President Coolidge in June, 1925. In spite of promises of action, 
the Senate had done nothing, with the result on January 10, 1933, a special 
message was sent to Congress urging immediate action. 
This convention has been adhered to by a large number 
of the other important nations and is practically stopped through 
failure of the United States to adhere to it. Its ratification 
would contribute to the ends being sought by the entire world 
for the prevention and limitation of war •••• If ••• it 
is impossible for the Senate to now ratify this treaty it is 
urgent that legislation should be passed conferring upon the 
President authority in his discretion to limit or forbid ship-
ment of arms for military purposes in cases where special under-
takings of cooperation can be secured with the principal arms 
manufacturing nations. 
While such a measure would not accomplish the whole of 
the purposes which the advance thought in the world requires, 
it would at least enable the Executive in special cases to place 
the United States in line with other nations who are willing 
to make such sacrifices in the prevention of military conflict.47 
There was little cooperation on this matter between the President 
and Mr. Roosevelt, the President-elect, or with Democratic leaders in 
Congress, and nothing was accomplished. 
ttHumanitariantt is a word that many admirers of Herbert Hoover find 
synonymous with him. However, he is also a realist, a practical man. 
One of his proposals for relieving human suffering in time of war was 
the immunity of food ships. His experiences as head of the Belgian Relief 
46iroover, Vol. 2, op. !::!!•i PP• 352-356. 
47 Myers, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 566. 
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during World War I and following the War, as Director of Relief, were 
centered on getting food to the starving. An important address regarding 
his belief was held on Armistice Day in 1929 at the Washington Auditorium. 
I am going to have the temerity to put forward an idea 
which might break through the involved legal questions and age-
old interpretations or right and wrong by a practical step which 
would solve a large part of the intrinsic problem • • • • 
For many years, and born or a poignant personal experience, 
I have held that food ships should be made free of any inter-
ference in times of war. I would ~lace all vessels laden solely 
with food supplies on the same footing as hospital ships. The 
time has come when we should remove starvation of women and chil-
dren from the weapons of warfare. 
• • • protection for overseas or imported supplies has 
been one of the most impelling causes of increasing naval arma-
ments and military alliances. Again, in countries which pro-
duce surplus food their economic stability is also to a 
considerable degree dependent upon keeping open the avenues 
of their trade in the export of such surplus, and this again 
stimulates armament on their part to protect such outlets • • • • 
In all important wars of recent years, to cut off or to 
protect such supplies has formed a large element in the strategy 
of all combatants. We cannot condemn any one nation; almost 
all who have been engaged in war have participated in it. The 
world must sooner or later recognize this as one of the under-
lying causes of its armed situation, but1 far beyond this, star-
vation should be rejected among the weapons of warfare • • • • 
The protection of food movements in time of war would con-
stitute a most important contribution to the rights of all parties, 
whether neutrals or belligerents, and would greatly tend toward 
lessening the pressure for naval strength. Foodstuffs comprise 
about 25 per cent of the commerce of the world but would con-
stitute a much more important por~~on of the trade likely to 
be interfered with by a blockade. 
This program was warmly received and vigorously approved, both in 
the united States and abroad. However, it met with great opposition in 
Great Britain and France, especially the latter on the basis of the strength 
of an economic blockade. President Hoover determined the matter would 
be renewed 'Whenever further opportunity presented itself. 
48Myers, Vol. l, ~· ~., PP• 129-131. 
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One little publicized action of the Hoover administration was taken 
on September 9, 1930, to temporarily stop all immigration into the United 
States in an effort to give more work to American unemployed. At that 
time, there were about 250,000 immigrants per year, and most or them tried 
to find work. An estimation has been made that this move prevented the 
addition of several hundred thousand persons to the unemployed lists with-
in the next three years. 49 
The moratorium is a tremendous and intricate subject with more than ade-
quate material tor a separate study. The reparations tangle and war debt 
is involved and complicated, but some attention must be given to President 
Hoover•s attempt to obtain a moratorium on as well as a revision of inter-
governmental debts. In the summer of 19311 a financial crisis in Austria 
and Germany was partially the result of the French withdrawing credit from 
Austrian banks because a proposed German-Austrian customs union of March 
21 could be interpreted as a move toward political union. As a result, the 
leading Austrian commercial bank, the Kredit Anstalt, failed. That in turn 
threatened the financial status of leading German banks and insurance com-
panies, and a flight of capital from Germany began. Then the German budget 
was unbalanced and American private credits were in a precarious situation. 
Financial insecurity spread from central Europe throughout the world. Coupled 
with the dangerous financial situation in Europe, the United States was 
deeply involved in an economic and business upheaval of its own. The 
European situation went from bad to worse and there was general concern 
and apprehension. After making what allllost amounted to a telephone survey 
of Congress, on June 20, 19311 President Hoover met the European collapse 
with a moratorium on intergovernmental debts.SO 
49Myers and Newton, 2.E• ~·, PP• 44-45. 
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President Hoover's proposal to postpone during one year all payments 
on intergovernmental debts was in part: 
The American Government proposes the postponement during 
one year o£ all payments on intergovernmental debts, reparations, 
and relief debts, both principal and interest, of course not 
including obligations of governments held by private parties. 
Subject to confirmation by Congress, the American government 
will postpone all payments upon the debts of foreign govern-
ments to the American Government payable during the fiscal year 
·beginning July l next, conditional on a like postponement for 
one year of all payments on intergovernmental debts owing 
the important creditor powers • • • • 
Wise and timely action should contribute to relieve the 
pressure of these adverse forces in foreign countries and should 
assist in the re-establishment of confidence, thus f~rw8rding 
political peace and economic stability in the world. 
Almost immediately after the announcement of the moratorium, there 
was a favorable response in prices and business. France was the only 
country that did not show enthusiastic response. The French approved 
"in principle" but would not include the "unconditional reparations" and 
"reparations in kind" from Germany. On instructions from the President, 
Secretary Stimson requested the German government show a cooperative at-
titude toward France in an effort to relieve the bitterness that had 
resulted from the German-Austrian customs union.52 
By July 6, 1931, all fifteen governments involved accepted the mor-
atorium,, and the following statement was released by the President: 
I am glad to announce that the American proposal £or one 
year•s postponement or all intergovernmental debts and repara-
tions has now been accepted in principle by all of the important 
creditor governments • • • • 
The technical difficulties arising from many complicated 
international agreements, which involve the aggregate payment 
between governments of over $80010001000 per annum, are now 
51rtrers, Vol. 1, 21?.• ~., PP• 591-592. 
52Myers and Newton, .22• ~., pp. 81-98. 
in the course of solution by the good will and earnest co-
operation of governmental leaders everywhere. 
The American part of the plan is, of course, subject to 
the approval by Congress, but I have received the individual 
assurances of support from a very large majority of the members 
of both Senate and House, irrespective of political affiliations. 
The acceptance of this proposal has meant sacrifices by 
the American people and by the former Allied Governments, who 
are with all others suffering from world-wide depression and 
deficits in governmental budgets. The economic load most seri-
ously oppressing the peoples of Germany and Central Europe 
will be immensely lightened. 
While the plan is particularly aimed to economic relief, 
yet economic relief means the swinging of men's minds from fear 
to confidence, the swinging of nations from the apprehension 
of disorder and governmental unemployment and agriculture.SJ 
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Immediately a new crisis developed because Europe completely failed 
to show any cooperation and thus was threatening the United States. 
Briefly, there was a large indebtedness among nations in short-term banking 
bills that had been issued by banks to banks at high interest rates that 
couldn't be met. Secretary of State Stimson and Secretary of the Treasury 
Mellon represented President Hoover at a conference in London to discuss 
the situation. Nothing seemed to be accomplished, so on July 17, President 
Hoover cabled to his two secretaries his Standstill Agreement whereby 
the banks of the countries who held the German short-term bills would 
hold them for a stipulated time. He took a firm stand that neither the 
American banks nor the American government should loan any more money 
to central Europe. After some objection and opposition, the Agreement 
was accepted on July 23, 1931.54 
Another crisis was soon at hand. The British financial situation 
was further weakened by the French withdrawal of gold, and the Bank of 
5~ers, Vol. 1, .2E• cit., PP• 595-596. 
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England defaulted on gold payments on September 21, 1931. The problem 
was intensified with reports of a mutiny in the British navy. American 
credit was weakened by foreign countries withdrawing gold and exchange. 
Tariffs abroad were increased. Revolutions were taking place, and there 
was general world apprehension. Panic was widespread. With the advice 
and support ot Cabinet members, a broad program was set up to meet the 
situation. One of the suggestions was the visit of Premier Laval or France 
to the United States, whereby it was hoped to eliminate some unpleasant 
impressions caused by recent actions or the French government, and to 
discuss the world economic situation. Pleasant personal relations were 
immediately established after the arrival of Premier Laval and his daughter 
on October 221 1931. If Premier Laval had intended to reduce French war 
debt payments, President Hoover soon let him know that the American settle-
ment was based on capacity to pay.55 The discussions dealt with three 
subjects: disarmament, readjustment of German reparations, and the main-
tenance of the gold standard. During their talks, President Hoover firmly 
maintained that the American policy of war debt payments was determined 
in view of the ability of each debtor to pay, and any change in such a 
policy would have to meet with the approval of Congress and the American 
people. As a result of their discussions, a joint statement was released 
when Premier Laval and his party left for home three days later: 
The traditional friendship between the United States and 
France, the absence of all controversy between our two govern-
ments, a record of many events in collaboration toward peace 
ot the world, embracing among its recent phases the adoption 
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, render it possible and opportune 
for the representatives of our governments to explore every 
aspect of the many problems in which we are mutual~ interested • 
We canvassed the economic situation in the world, the trends 
S'iioover, Vol. 2, op. ~., P• 95. 
• • • 
in international relations bearing upon it; the problems of 
the forthcoming conference for limitation and reduction of 
armaments; the effect of the depression on payments under inter-
governmental debts; the stabilization of international exchanges 
and other financial and economic subjects • • • • 
It is our joint purpose that the conference for limitation 
of armaments will not fail to take advantage of the great oppor-
tunity which presents itself and that it will be capable of 
meeting what is in reality its true mission, that is the organi-
zation on a firm f'oundation of permanent peace • • • • 
Our especial emphasis has been upon the most important 
means through which the efforts of our governments could be 
exerted toward restoration of economic stability and confidence. 
Particularly we are convinced of the importance of monetary 
stability as an essential factor in the restoration of normal 
economic life in the world in which the maintenance of the gold 
standard in France and the United States will serve as a major 
influence •• • • 
While in the short time at our disposal it has not been 
possible to formulate definite programs, we find that we view 
the nature of these financial and economic problems in the same 
light and that this understanding on our part should serve to 
pave the way for helpful action by our respective governments.56 
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On November 19, 1931, the Germans carried out the terms of the rep-
arations agreements. On December 10, 1931, President Hoover asked Congress 
to adjust temporarily debt payments in view of the world depression: 
As we approach the new year it is clear that a number of 
the governments indebted to us will be unable to meet further 
payments to us in full pending recovery in their economic life. 
It is useless to blind ourselves to an obvious fact. There-
fore it will be necessary in some cases to make still further 
temporary adjustments • • • • 
I recommend the re-creation of the World War Foreign Debt 
Commission, with authority to examine such problems as may arise 
in connection with these debts during the present economic 
emergency, and tg report to the Congress its conclusions and 
recommendations.~7 
Congress did not go along with the request. As a result, war debts 
were practically repudiated by debtor countries, with the American tax 
5~ers, Vol. 2, 2£• ~., PP• 19-21. 
57~., P• 75. 
payers having to assume the loss. 
In regard to foreign possessions, President Hoover's policy was 
far from an imperialistic one. He felt that the United States should 
have only such areas as would be vital to American defense. 
The problem of the Philippines was considerably bigger since their 
independence and separation were related to their economic stability. 
President Hoover was agreeable to a complete separation of the Islands 
which would not bind the United States to their defense. He sent Sec-
retary of War, Patrick H. Hurley, to the Philippines to survey their 
social, economic, political, and educational conditions. After his return, 
President Hoover issued the following statement on October 27, 1931: 
Independence of the Philippines at some time has been directly 
or indirectly promised by every President and by the Congress. 
In accord with those undertakings, the problem is one of time. 
In the interest of the Philippine people, the time element in-
volves the necessity that independence must be assured of dura-
bility and the Government of the Philippines must be assured 
of stability • • • the economic independence of the Philippines 
must be attained before political independence can be successful. 
Independence tomorrow without assured economic stability would 
result in the collapse of Philippine government r~ienues and 
the collapse of all economic life in the islands.' 
Filipino politicians and .American sugar producers brought pressure 
to bear, and in December, 1932, Congress passed a bill for independence. 
President Hoover felt the economic life of the Islands would collapse 
and vetoed the bill. 
The Philippine people have today as great a substance 
of ordered liberty and human freedom as any people in the world. 
They lack the form of separate nationality which is indeed 
their rightful spiritual aspiration. 
• • • the period of intermediate government prior to com-
plete independence ••• in this act is too short, too violent • • • • 
A large part of the motivation for the passage of this 
bill is presumed relief to certain American agricultural indus-
tries from competition by Philippine products • • • • 
58 Myers, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 24. 
-The income of the Philippine government has never in the 
past been sufficient to meet, in addition to other expenditures, 
the cost of supporting even the Filipino Scouts, much less an 
army or navy • • • • 
In the meantime we should develop steadily through an 
expansion of the organic act a larger importance to their own 
officials by extension of authority to cabinet government •• 
We are here dealing with one of the most precious rights 
of man--national independence interpreted as separate nation-
ality. It is the national independence of 13,000,000 human 
beings. We have here a specific duty. The ideals under which 
we undertook this responsibility, our own national instincts, 
and our institutions which we have implanted on these islands 
breathe with these desires. It is a goal not to be reached 
• • 
by yielding to selfish interests, to resentments, or to abstrac-
tions, but with full recognition of our responsibilities and 
all their implications and all the forces which would destroy 
the boon we seek to confer and the dangers to our freedom from 
entanglements which our actions may bring. Neither our successors 
nor history will discharge us of responsibility for actions 
which diminish the liberty we seek to confer nor for dangers 
which we create for ourselves as a consequence of our acts. 
This legislation puts both our people and the Philippine people 
not on the road to liberty and safety, which we desire, but 
on the path leag~g to new and enlarged dangers to liberty and 
freedom itself. 
The Philippine Independence Act was passed over President Hoover's 
veto on January 17, 1933, with provision made for the United States to 
give complete independence within ten years after the establishment of 
a new government. 
The policies and problems of the Hoover administration in dealing 
with the Far East are lengthy and somewhat complicated. To obtain the 
cooperation of other nations in restraining Japan was the focal point 
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of the issue. Following World War I when democracy was popular in Japan 
for a short time, a few members of the peasant class achieved the rank of 
officers in the armed forces. Many of them were poorly educated, chauvinistic, 
and obsessed with almost a fanatical desire toward any kind of agitation 
59~., PP• 569-576. 
and conspiracy. On the night of September 18, 1931, the young officer ele-
ment with no real provocation suddenly attacked Manchuria, an action which 
helped destroy the stability in eastern Asia. The Japanese army maintained 
that an explosion set by Chinese troops had occurred along the main line of 
the Southern Manchuria Railroad. Manchuria had previously been under the 
influence of Russia, but that country was busily occupied with collectivizing 
farms and its second five-year plan and merely hoped the Japanese invasion 
would move no further west.60 Even though the sudden attack on Manchuria 
was minor in comparison with the far-reaching events that soon followed, 
it was indeed a complex problem at that time. The United States had considers-
ble commercial and political interests in the Far East. President Hoover 
felt such an attack on the part of Japan was a definite violation of the 
Nine-Power (Open Door) Treaty of 1921, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.61 Because of Secretary Stimson's sojourn 
in the Philippines and his intimate knowledge of the Orient, he was a valuable 
advisor to the President. It should also be remembered the President had 
spent several years in China as an engineer, which considerably helped in 
his own judgment and decisions. Both he and Secretary Stimson wanted to 
influence Japan to return the captured territory on Asia's mainland and 
thereby hoped to halt Japanese aggression. 
A vigorous protest was made to the Japanese government by Secretary 
Stimson on September 24, 1931. The Secretary also expressed a willingness 
to cooperate with the League of Nations when it applied sanctions against 
a country guilty of aggression.62 
60Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy (New York, w. w. Norton and 
Company, 1959), P• 351. 
61william Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-
1933 (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), pp. 154-155. --
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In the President's message to Congress on December 10, 1931, Mr. 
Hoover said: 
We have been deeply concerned over the situation in Man-
churia. As parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and to the Nine 
Power Treaty, we have a responsibility in maintaining the in-
tegrity of China and a direct interest with other nations in 
maintaining peace there. 
When this controversy originated in September the League 
0£ Nations was in session and China appealed to the Council 
of that body which at once undertook measures of conciliation 
between China and Japan. Both China and Japan have participated 
in these proceedings before the Council ever since. Under the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact all of the signatories, including China 
and Japan, have covenanted to seek none but pacific means in 
the settlement of their disputes • • • • It seemed • • • both 
wise and appropriate rather to aid and advise with the League 
and thus have unity of world effort to maintain peace than to 
take independent action. In all negotiations • • • the Depart-
ment of State has maintained complete freedom or judgment and 
action as to participation in any measures which the League 
might finally be determined upon. 
Immediately after the outbreak of the trouble this govern-
ment advised both Japan and China of its serious interest. 
Subsequently it communicated its views to both goverrnnents re-
garding their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In 
this action we were joined by other nations signatory or the 
pact. This Government has consistently and repeatedly by dip-
lomatic representations indicated its unrem5tting solicitude 
that these treaty obligations be respected. 3 
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Late in 1931 during the Paris meeting of the Council of the League, 
Ambassador Dawes tried to encourage the Council and bolster it to take juris-
diction in the Japanese issue. It was in this manner that the United States 
gave additional strength to League action during the Far East crisis. It 
is of interest that Ambassador Dawes observed strict protocol by remaining 
in his headquarters at the Ritz Hotel rather than going to the meetings of 
the Council at Quai d'Orsay.64 
The whole picture of the situation in the Far East is vividly portrayed 
6.3t.1yers, Vol. 2, op. cit., PP• 76-77. 
64Ferrel, op. ~., P• 352. 
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in detail by Secretary Stimson in his writings.65 In December, 1931, the 
President suggested to Secretary Stimson that the doctrine of nonrecognition 
be applied to Japan1 he did not endorse either military or economic sanc-
tions against Japan. On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent a note to 
Japan informing that country of the American policy of nonrecognition to 
an aggressor nation. The British and French did not endorse this action 
and the Japanese were quick to capitalize on this disagreement. On January 
28, 1932, Japan attacked Shanghai and central China in a series of isolated 
and uncoordinated military actions. Resistance was greater than the Japanese 
war lords had expected and before the military forces gave up, over 50,000 
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regular army troops were involved. When the Japanese used aerial attack 
(shades of things to come) on a defenseless part of the Chinese sector of 
Shanghai, Western feeling was one of indignation and rage. Immediately the 
President ordered a strong force of .A.~erican troops and naval forces to go 
to Shanghai to protect American lives. Hawaiian and Philippine bases were 
strengthened and strict orders were sent that action should be limited to 
protecting Americans. 
There was disagreement between President Hoover and Secretary Stimson 
as to effective action. Secretary Stimson was in great favor of economic 
sanctions and felt Congress would support such a plan which he believed 
would not result in war. He likewise felt that even though Britain and 
France would not join in such measures, the United States would produce 
the desired result acting on its own. President Hoover was in complete 
disagreement: he felt Congress would not support such a plan, he would 
not recommend it, and he believed it could lead to war. The President 
65stimson and McBundy, _2E• ~-1 PP• 220-263. 
66 Ferrel, .2£• ~., P• 354. 
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and Secretary did reach agreement in pursuing a doctrine of nonrecognition:. 
all nations agree not to recognize the territory acquired by Japan as viola-
ting the Kellogg Pact. In February, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent identical 
communications to Japan and China in which it was stated that the United 
States would not recognize any action in the Far East that would endanger 
American rights. The note had no etfect.67 
It was also in February that the famous letter from Secretary Stimson 
to Senator William E. Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, was made public. In eloquent terms, it stated the American position 
against Japanese aggression. Humanitarian interests toward the Chinese in 
the American Far Eastern policy were nobly presented at the end of the 
letter.68 Japan was not to be deterred. Problems of the world-wide depres-
sion were becoming increasingly serious and public opinion channeled itself 
in that direction. 
On March 11, 1932, the League of Nations agreed to the policy of 
nonrecognition. Japan did stop attacking central China but whether or not 
the action of the League plus that of the United States can take credit 
is debatable. 
Major General Frank R. McCoy was the unofficial American representative 
who participated on the Izy-tton Commission, employed by the Council of the 
League, to review conditions in Manchuria. After this Commission interviewed 
various government leaders in the Far East, it reported that Japanese claims 
of self-defense were "inadmissible." On February 24, 1933, it made the 
recommendation that Manchuria be placed under the supervision of the Chinese 
67nulles, ~· cit., p. 282. 
68 For complete text of letter, see Stimson and McBundy, .22• ~., 
PP• 249-254. 
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government as an autonomous state. It was too late for any recommendation 
to be meaningful. On that same day, the Japanese delegation at Geneva under 
the leadership of Mr. Matsuoka, walked out of the League.69 The Manchurian 
affair had a sad ending in the annuls of diplomacy. 
Throughout his administration, President Hoover maintained a policy of 
nonrecognition of Communist Russia. Toward the end of his yerm of office, 
the world was flooded with counterfeit American money printed by the Soviets. 
On January 31 1933, a Russian possessing counterfeit American money was 
arrested by Federal authorities as soon as he arrived in this country. The 
following day another Communist was arrested in Chicago for distributing 
Soviet-printed counterfeit American money. A long prison term resulted.70 
During his presidency, Mr. Hoover's policies on World War debts 
were definite and precise. He was strongly opposed to cancellation and 
felt each debtor should pay insofar as it was able. Any time a change 
was necessary in view of the world depression, he was in favor of an adjust-
ment being made. A European Conference was held at Lausanne on July 8, 
1932, which was a movement toward a reduction of war debts regardless 
of capacity to pay. President Hoover was consistent in his policy that 
there should be no cancellation of war debts. Only two days after the 
Presidential election, in which the Hoover Administration was com9letely 
defeated, all of the debtor countries asked for a suspension of payment 
until the debt problem could be reviewed. Payments were due December 15, 
and President Hoover announced there was not adequate time to examine the 
question before that date. President Hoover contacted President-elect 
69samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New 
York, Henry Holt and Company, 1946), p. 817. ~ ~ 
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Roosevelt and the two, each with his advisors, met at the White House 
on November 22 to discuss this question and attempt to agree on a policy. 
It was decided that both the President and President-elect would issue 
a statement of war-debt principles and moratorium methods. Most of the 
debtor countries met the December 15 payment with the exception of France, 
who maintained Mr. Roosevelt had not clearly stated payment was necessary 
before negotiation.71 
The weeks after the overwhelming defeat of President Hoover in the 
election of 1932 and the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt in the follow-
ing spring were of extreme difficulty, and there is far from complete 
agreement on the actions and motives of the two men during that time. 
There was an attempt at cooperation but there was not a smooth transferring 
of authority. Mr. Hoover had the responsibility but actually little power, 
and Mr. Roosevelt had a mandate but no legal authority. They were both 
stubborn men. 
In late May, 1932, Secretary Stimson had started preparations for 
an International Monetary and Economic Conference which would try to adjust 
inter-governmental debts, stabilize world currency, and eliminate trade 
barriers. A preliminary meeting of experts had already been held and 
there was much encouragement that the con£erence could make a real con-
tribution for future progress.72 
In his message to Congress on December 19, 1932, President Hoover 
reported on the Economic and Disarmament Conferences and also discussed 
the war-debt question with the conclusions: 
71tiilbur and Hyde, op. cit., PP• 506-523. 
72Myers and Newton, op. cit., p. 277. 
1. A number of the most serious problems have now arisen 
and we are bound to recognize and deal with them. 
2. It is of great importance that preparatory action should 
be taken at once otherwise time will be lost while destructive 
forces are continuing against our agriculture, employment and 
business. 
3. Adequate and proper machinery for dealing with them 
must be created. 
4. • • • the discussion of debts is necessarily connected 
with the solution of major problems at the World Economic Con-
ference and the Arms Conference. The ideal way would • • • 
be that some of our representatives in these matters should 
be selected at once who can perform both these functions of 
preparing for the World Economic Conference, and should exchange 
views upon the debt questions with certain nations at once and 
to advise upon the course to be pursued as to others. It would 
be an advantage for some of them to be associated with the Arms 
Conference • • • • 
5. Discussions in respect to both debt questions and the 
World Economic Conference cannot be concluded during my adminis-
tration, yet the economic situation in the world necessitates 
the preliminary work essential to its success • • •• 
I propose, therefore, to seek the cooperation of President-
elect Roosevelt in the organization of machinery for advance-
ment of consideration of these problems • • • • 
The situation is one of such urgency that we require na-
tional solidarity and national cooperation if we are to serve 
the welfare of the American people and indeed if we are to con-
quer the f orc'~ which today threaten the very foundations of 
civilization. 
42 
President Hoover then contacted Mr. Roosevelt about choosing a Com-
mission to work on the war debt question and international stabilization, 
but the incoming administration did not desire to help form such a Com-
mission nor did it apparently approve o:f the purpose for one. The President-
elect felt that regular diplomatic channels would be better for negotiation 
rather than a new commission. This was quite disappointing to President 
Hoover who felt that even though he had only two months remaining in the 
73r'1yers, Vol. 2, op. ~., pp. 552-554. 
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White House, some definite action should be taken to eliminate doubts 
and degeneration of foreign affairs. Another conference between the Pres-
ident and President-elect was scheduled for January 20. By the end of 
that month, Mr. Roosevelt himself handled negotiations with the British 
government regarding the war debt problem between the two countries.74 
In his Lincoln Day Address of 1933 in New York City, President Hoover 
presented to the nation his ideas on international currency and the need 
to maintain the gold standard: 
• • • so long as we engage in the export and import of 
goods and in financial activities abroad our price levels and 
credit system, our employment, and above all our fears will 
be greatly affected by foreign influences • • • • The time has 
now come when nations must accept • • • the obligations to co-
operate in achieving world stability so mankind may again re-
sume the march of progress • • • the next great constructive 
step in remedy of the illimitable human suffering from this 
depression lies in the international field. 
• • • we find some forty-four countries which have placed 
restrictions upon the movement of gold and exchange or are other-
wise definitely off of the gold standard • • • • 
A new phase is now developing among these nations that 
is the rapid degeneration into economic war which threatens 
to engulf the world • • • • 
Ever since the storm began in Europe the United States 
has held staunchly to the gold standard • • • • 
Another phenomenon of the gold situation has increased 
disturbance and wrought havoc. That is the effect of waves 
or fear and apprehension. 
• • • the currencies or the world are fluctuating spas-
medically. 
• • • the solution lies in the re-establishment or con-
fidence • • • that solution can only be found now and found 
quickly through the re-establishment of gold standards among 
important nations • • • • 
rr the major nations will enter the road leading to the 
74Myers and Newton, op. cit., PP• 275-297. 
early re-establishment of the gold standard, then and then only 
can the abnormal barriers to trade, the quotas, preferences, 
discriminatory agreements, and tariffs which exceed the differ-
ences in cost of production between nations be removed, uniform 
trade privileges among all nations be re-established and the 
threat of economic war averted. 
• • • the welfare of the American people rests upon sol-
idarity ••• in cooperation with other natio91 in strength-
ening the whole economic fabric of the world. ~ 
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Throughout his administration, President Hoover determinedly opposed 
any involvement in European or Asian affairs that did not concern the 
United States, and he would not participate in an economic sanction against 
another nation. When he left the presidency on March 4, 1933, three con-
f erences toward easing world tensions were still underway: World Land 
Disarmament, World Economic Conference, and the extension of naval limi-
t t . 76 a ions. 
75Myers, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 587-595. 
76william Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-
1933 (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), PP• 2$4-25$. 
45 
The foreign policies and philosophy of Mr. Hoover during his pres-
idency have been reviewed with serious effort toward neither praise nor 
condemnation. There was no attempt to evaluate or to judge the policies 
as successful or failures in American diplomacyJ however, if a lasting 
peace was his objective, indeed Mr. Hoover failed. Policies surveyed 
include the relationship with Latin America, the World Court, the World 
Bank, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the tariff, naval limitation, reduction 
in land armies, trade in arms, immigration changes, the moratorium on 
intergovernmental debts, the Philippines, Japanese aggression, war debts, 
and a World Economic Conf'erence. If government or confidential material 
of' these particular years is not yet available for publication, then this 
survey is far from complete. It is characteristic that Mr. Hoover's policies 
and philosophy of the present seem to be remarkably basic and consistent 
with those he followed more than thirty years ago. 
President Hoover was passionately and unsophisticatedly devoted to 
peace. He made every attempt to focus his foreign policies toward that 
objective. By the same token, he believed in thorough preparedness by 
the United States, but only for defensive purposes. If fair judgment 
is to be made about the wisdom of his actions, if his statesmanship is 
to be deemed moral and ethical, if he was basically too consistent, the 
tempo and conditions of the world in the late twenties and early thirties 
must be remembered against his own background and experiences. There 
were choices and alternatives to be faced; President Hoover accumulated 
and systematized the facts with able assistance, methodically studied 
them, and then made the decisions himself. He had faith in the destiny 
of his country. 
Last August the 10th, Mr. Hoover reached his eighty-seventh birthday. 
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On~ John Adams, the second president of the United States who became 
ninety before he died, lived longer than has the thirty-first president. 
47 
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